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This paper presents a sequential search model where consumers look for sev-
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rms. In a multiproduct search market, both
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For example, a consumer may return to previously visited rms before running
out of options, and prices can decrease with search costs. The framework is ex-
tended by allowing rms to use bundling strategies. Bundling tends to reduce
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1 Introduction
Consumers often look for several products on a given shopping trip. For example, during
ordinary grocery shopping they buy food, drinks and household products; in high street
shopping they purchase clothes, shoes and other goods; in the Christmas season they
look for several presents. Sometimes a consumer seeks electronic combinations such
as computer, printer and scanner; when furnishing a house they need several furniture
items; when going on holiday or attending a conference they book both ights and
hotels; and new parents look for many baby products. On the other side of the market,
there are many multiproduct rms such as supermarkets, department stores, electronic
retailers, and travel agencies which often supply most of the products a consumer is
searching for in a particular shopping trip. Usually the shopping process also involves
non-negligible search costs. Consumers need to reach the store, nd out each products
price and how suitable they are, and then may decide to visit another store in pursuit
of better deals. In e¤ect, in many cases a consumer chooses to shop for several goods
together to save on search costs.
Despite the ubiquity of multiproduct search and multiproduct rms, the search
literature has been largely concerned with single-product search markets. In part, this
is because a multiproduct search model is less tractable than a single-product one. In
this paper, I develop a tractable model for multiproduct search markets, and show that
a multiproduct search market exhibits some qualitatively di¤erent properties compared
to the single-product case. I then argue that multiproduct search has rich market
implications, and the developed framework can be used to address interesting economic
issues such as countercyclical pricing, the welfare impact of competitive bundling, loss
leader pricing, and endogenous retail market structure.
The basic framework of this paper is a sequential search model in which consumers
look for several products and care about both price and product suitability. Each rm
supplies all relevant products, but each product is horizontally di¤erentiated across
rms. By incurring a search cost, a consumer can visit a rm and learn all product and
price information. In particular, the cost of search is incurred jointly for all products
(i.e., there are economies of scale in search), and the consumer does not need to buy
all products from the same rm (i.e., they can mix and match after sampling at least
two rms if rms allow them to do so). Both features are realistic and important in
multiproduct search markets.
In the basic model, I assume that rms use linear pricing strategies (i.e., set separate
prices for each product). A distinctive feature of consumer behavior in multiproduct
search is that a consumer may return to buy from previously visited rms before running
out of options. By contrast, in a standard single-product sequential search model, a
consumer never returns to earlier rms before sampling all rms. As far as pricing is
concerned, with multiproduct consumer search, if a rm lowers one products price, this
will induce more consumers who are visiting it to terminate search and buy some other
products as well. That is, a reduction of one products price also boosts the demand
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for the rms other products. I term this the joint search e¤ect. As a result, even
physically independent products are priced like complements.
Due to the joint search e¤ect, prices can decline with search costs in a multiproduct
search market. When search costs increase, the standard e¤ect is that consumers will
become more reluctant to shop around, which will induce rms to raise their prices.
However, in a multiproduct search market, higher search costs can also strengthen the
joint search e¤ect and make the products in each rm more like complements, which
will induce rms to lower their prices. When the latter e¤ect dominates prices will fall
with search costs.
Another prediction is that rms in a multiproduct search environment tend to set
lower prices than in a single-product search environment. This is for two reasons: rst,
due to economies of scale in search, consumers on average sample more rms in the
multiproduct search case than in the single-product search case, which tends to increase
each products own-price elasticity; second, multiproduct search causes the joint search
e¤ect, which gives rise to the complementary pricing phenomenon and so increases
productscross-price elasticities. This observation can provide a possible explanation for
the phenomenon of countercyclical pricing prices of many retail products drop during
high-demand periods such as weekends and holidays.1 During high-demand periods, it
is often the case that a higher proportion of consumers become multiproduct searchers
(e.g., many households conduct their weekly grocery shopping during weekends), and
so retailers have incentives to reduce their prices.
In multiproduct markets, bundling is a widely observed pricing strategy. Bundling
is often used as a price discrimination or entry deterrence device.2 This paper argues
that in a search environment, bundling has a new function: it can discourage consumers
from exploring rivalsdeals. This is because bundling reduces the anticipated benet
from mixing-and-matching after visiting another rm. This search-discouraging e¤ect
works against the typical pro-competitive e¤ect of competitive bundling in a perfect
information scenario.3 When search costs are relatively high the new e¤ect can be
such that bundling benets rms and harms consumers.4 Therefore, our ndings in-
dicate that assuming away information frictions may signicantly distort the welfare
1See relevant empirical evidence documented in, for example, Warner and Barsky (1995), MacDon-
ald (2000), and Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003).
2See, for instance, Adams and Yellen (1976), and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) for the
view of price discrimination, and Whinston (1990) for the view of entry deterrence.
3Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989), and Nalebu¤ (2000) studied competitive pure
bundling, and Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Anderson and Leruth (1993), Thanassoulis (2007), and
Armstrong and Vickers (2010) studied competitive mixed bundling. The main insight emerging from
all these works is that compared to linear pricing, bundling (whether pure or mixed) has a tendency
to intensify price competition, and under the assumptions of unit demand and full market coverage
(which are also retained in this paper) it typically reduces rm prots and boosts consumer welfare.
4In di¤erent settings, Carbajo, de Meza and Seidmann (1990) and Chen (1997) argue that (asym-
metric) bundling can create verticalproduct di¤erentiation between rms, thereby softening price
competition.
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assessment of bundling.5
Related literature. Since the seminal work by Stigler (1961), there has been a vast
literature on search, but most papers focus on single object search (see, for example,
Diamond, 1971, Burdett and Judd, 1983, and Stahl, 1989 for consumer search mod-
els). There is a small branch of literature that investigates the optimal stopping rule in
multiproduct search (Burdett and Malueg, 1981, Carlson and McAfee, 1984, and Gatti,
1999).6 They have emphasized the similarity between single-product and multiproduct
search in the sense that in both cases the stopping rule often features the static reserva-
tion property. However, I argue that despite this similarity, consumer search behavior
still exhibits substantial di¤erences between the two cases.
More importantly, the above works do not consider an active supply side. McAfee
(1995) studies a multiproduct search model with endogenous prices. It extends Bur-
dett and Judd (1983) to the multiproduct case. Each product is homogenous across
stores, and by incurring a search cost a consumer can learn price information from a
random number of stores. In particular, there are consumers who learn information
from only one store. As a result, similar to Burdett and Judd (1983), rms adopt
mixed pricing strategies, reecting the trade-o¤ between exploiting less informed con-
sumers and competing for more informed consumers. However, multiproduct search
generates multiple types of (symmetric) equilibria. In particular, there is a continuum
of equilibria in which rms randomize prices on the reservation frontier such that one
products price decline must be associated with the rise of some other prices.7 The
model o¤ers interesting insights, but both the multiplicity of equilibria and the com-
plication of equilibrium characterization restrict its applicability. This paper develops
an alternative multiproduct search framework with di¤erentiated products, where the
symmetric equilibrium is unique and prices are deterministic.
Lal and Matutes (1994) also present a multiproduct search model where two rms
locate at the two ends of a Hotelling city and each product is otherwise homogenous
across rms. Each consumer needs to pay a location-specic cost to reach rms and
discover the price information. Their setting is, however, subject to the Diamond
paradox: each rm charges the monopoly prices and no consumers participate in the
5The European Commission has recently branded all bundled nancial products as anti-competitive
and unfair. One of the main reasons is that the practice reduces consumer mobility. See the consultation
document On the Study of Tying and Other Potentially Unfair Commercial Practices in the Retail
Financial Service Section, 2009.
6In Burdett and Malueg (1981) and Carlson and McAfee (1984), consumers search for serval prod-
ucts among a large number of multiproduct stores that supply homogenous products and set random
prices according to an exogenous price distribution. The former mainly deals with the case with free
recall, and the latter deals with the case with no recall. Gatti (1999) considers a more general setting
in which consumers search for prices to maximize a general indirect utility function.
7In the other type of equilibria, rms randomize prices over the acceptance set (not just on its
border). They are, however, qualitatively similar to the single-product equilibrium in the sense that
the marginal price distribution for each product is the same as in the single-product search case, and
so is the prot from each product.
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market. Lal and Matutes show that rms can avoid the market collapse by advertising
prices of a subset of products. In one type of equilibrium, each rm advertises a low
price (even below marginal cost) of one product to persuade consumers to visit the store
(i.e., loss leading occurs), but charges the monopoly price for the other unadvertised
product. In equilibrium, consumers do not search beyond the rst visited rm and
so two-stop shopping never happens. In my model with product-level di¤erentiation,
consumers search for both low prices and high product suitability, and an equilibrium
with an active market exists even without advertising and two-stop shopping takes place
as we often observe in the real market.8
In terms of the modelling approach, this paper is built on the single-product search
model with di¤erentiated products (Weitzman, 1979, Wolinsky, 1986, and Anderson and
Renault, 1999). Recently, this framework has been adopted to study various economic
issues.9 Compared to the homogeneous product search model, models with product
di¤erentiation often better reect consumer behavior in markets that are typically char-
acterized by nonstandardized products. Moreover, they avoid the well-known modelling
di¢ culty suggested by Diamond (1971), who shows that with homogeneous products
and positive search costs (no matter how small) all rms will charge a monopoly price
and no consumers search beyond the rst sampled rm. In search models with product
di¤erentiation, there are some consumers who are ill-matched with their initial choice
of supplier and then search further, so that the pro-competitive benet of actual search
is present.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model
with linear pricing and analyzes consumer search behavior. Section 3 characterizes
equilibrium linear prices and conducts comparative statics analysis, and an application
to countercyclical pricing is also discussed. Section 4 studies bundling in a search
market and examines its welfare impact relative to linear pricing. Section 5 concludes,
and discusses other applications to loss leader pricing and endogenous retail market
structure. Omitted details are presented in the Appendix.
8Ellison (2005) uses Lal and Matutess framework to study add-on pricing by assuming that the
base products price information is perfect while the add-ons price information is not. (In the end
of this paper, I discuss a related variant in which consumers only need to search for one products
information.) Shelegia (2012) studies a multiproduct version of Varian (1980) in which for exogenous
reasons one group of consumers visits only one store while the other visits two. Rhodes (2011) proposes
a multiproduct monopoly model in which each consumer knows her private valuations for all products
but needs to incur a cost to reach the rm and learn prices. He shows that selling multiple products
can solve the Diamond hold-up problem, which would unravel the market in a single-product case with
inelastic consumer demand.
9See, for instance, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2011) for the market implications
of prominence and non-random consumer search, Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cunat (2012) for how the
decline of search costs a¤ects product design, and Haan and Moraga-González (2011) for attention-
grabbing advertising.
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2 A Model of Multiproduct Search
There are a large number of consumers in the market with measure normalized to one.
Each consumer is looking for two products (e.g., two furniture items, or clothes and
shoes), and they have unit demand for each product. There are n  2 multiproduct
rms in the market, each supplying both products at a constant marginal cost, which
is normalized to zero.
Each product is horizontally di¤erentiated across rms. For example, di¤erent rms
may supply di¤erent brands of furniture or clothes and shoes with di¤erent styles, and
consumers have idiosyncratic tastes. Specically, a consumers valuations for the two
products in each rm are randomly drawn from a common joint cumulative distrib-
ution function F (u1; u2) dened on [u1; u1]  [u2; u2] which has a continuous density
f(u1; u2). The match utilities are realized independently across rms and consumers
(but a consumer may have correlated match utilities for the two products in the same
rm). For simplicity, I assume that the two products are neither complements nor sub-
stitutes, in the sense that a consumer obtains an additive utility u1+u2 if product i has
a match utility ui, i = 1; 2. Let Fi(ui) and Hi(uijuj) denote the marginal and condi-
tional distribution functions; fi(ui) and hi(uijuj) denote the marginal and conditional
densities.
I assume that all consumers buy both products in equilibrium, i.e., the market
is fully covered.10 (This is the case, for example, when consumers have no outside
options or when they have large basic valuations for each product on top of the above
match utilities.) Consumers do not need to purchase both products from the same
rm. This possibility of multi-stop shopping is realistic and also important for our
model. Otherwise, the model would degenerate to a single-product one with a composite
product with match utility u1+u2. In the basic model, rms use linear pricing strategies
and charge a separate price for each product.
Initially consumers are assumed to have imperfect information about the (actual)
prices rms are charging and match utilities of all products.11 But they can gather
information through a sequential search process: by incurring a search cost s  0, a
consumer can visit a rm and nd out both of its prices (p1; p2) and both of its match
utilities (u1; u2). At each rm (except the last one), the consumer faces the following
options: stop searching and buy both products (maybe from rms visited earlier), or
buy one product and keep searching for the other, or keep searching for both products.
The cost of search is assumed to be independent of the number of products a consumer
is looking for, which reects economies of scale in search. Finally, I suppose that
consumers have free recall/return, i.e., there are no extra costs in buying products from
10The assumption of full market coverage is often adopted in oligopoly models. Our main insights
carry over to the case without this assumption (though the analysis will become more involved).
11If consumers purchase products frequently, they may know both price and product information
before search. However, in reality both prices and product variants in many retailers change over time,
such that imperfect information might be still a plausible presumption.
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a previously visited store.
The timing is as follows: Firms set prices simultaneously rst, and then consumers
start to search without observing rmsactual prices (though they hold the equilibrium
belief about rmspricing strategy). After visiting each rm, consumers decide whether
to stop searching or not. Both consumers and rms are assumed to be risk neutral. I
focus on symmetric equilibria in which rms set the same prices and consumers sample
rms in a random order (and without replacement).12 The equilibrium concept I use
is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Each rm sets its prices to maximize prots,
given its expectation of consumerssearch behavior and other rmspricing strategy.
Consumers search optimally, to maximize their expected surplus, given the match utility
distribution and their rational beliefs about rmspricing strategy. At each rm, even
after observing o¤-equilibrium o¤ers, consumers hold the equilibrium belief about the
unsampled rmsprices.13
I have made several simplifying assumptions to make the model tractable, and it is
useful to discuss them at this point.
Economies of scale in search. The assumption that the search cost is independent
of the number of products a consumer is seeking is an approximation when the search
cost is mainly for learning the existence of a seller or for reaching the store. In the
other polar case where the cost of search is solely from product inspection and so
totally divisible among products, the multiproduct search problem degenerates to two
separate single-product search problems.14 In reality, most situations are in between (a
typical shopping process involves a xed cost for reaching the store and also variable
in-store search costs for inspecting each product). Our simplication is made both for
analytical convenience and for highlighting the di¤erence between multiproduct and
single-product search.
Free recall. Free recall is often assumed in the consumer search literature. It could
be appropriate, for instance, when a consumer can phone previously visited rms (e.g.,
furniture stores) to order the products she decides to buy, or when shopping online a
consumer can leave the browsed websites open. In most consumer markets, however,
there are positive returning costs. I choose to assume free recall both for tractability,
and for facilitating comparison with the single-product search model in Wolinsky (1986)
12As usual in search models, there exists an uninteresting equilibrium where consumers expect all
rms to set very high prices and do not participate in the market at all, and so rms have no incentive
to reduce their prices. I do not consider this equilibrium further. The issue of possible asymmetric
equlibria will be discussed later.
13Notice that in our setting there are no correlated economic shocks (e.g., aggregate cost shocks)
across rms and so their pricing decisions are independent of each other.
14The case with divisible inspection costs among products will be non-trivial if consumers have to
one-stop shop (e.g., due to bundling). After inspecting a product at one rm, a consumer needs to
decide whether to continue to inspect the other product at the same rm or to inspect products in other
rms. (This case is also equivalent to a search problem with multi-attribute products and separable
inspection costs among attributes.)
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and Anderson and Renault (1999) (both of which assume free recall).
Independent products. In reality the products that a consumer is seeking in a partic-
ular shopping trip are rarely independent. In many circumstances (e.g., when shopping
for clothes and shoes), they are more or less intrinsic complements in the sense that
a higher valuation for one product increases the consumers willingness to pay for the
other (e.g., the utility function takes the form of u1 + u2 + u1u2 with  > 0). As I
discuss later, considering complementary valuations of this kind will complicate analy-
sis but not generate important new insights. In addition, given the assumption of full
market coverage, the two products in my model can also be regarded as perfect comple-
ments in the sense that consumers can obtain positive utility only by consuming both
of them together.
2.1 The optimal stopping rule
I rst derive the optimal stopping rule (which has been proved in Burdett and Malueg,
1981, or Gatti, 1999 in a price search scenario). The rst observation is that given the
indivisible search cost and free recall, a consumer will never buy one product rst and
keep searching for the other. Hence, at any store (except the last one) the consumer
faces only two options: stop searching and buy both products (one of which may be
from a rm visited earlier), or keep searching for both.
Denote by
 i(x) 
Z ui
x
(ui   x)dFi(ui) =
Z ui
x
[1  Fi(ui)]dui (1)
the expected incremental benet from sampling one more product i when the maximum
utility of product i so far is x and all product i have the same price. (The second equality
is from integration by parts.) Then the optimal stopping rule when all rms charge the
same prices is as follows:
Lemma 1 Suppose prices are linear and symmetric across rms. Suppose the maxi-
mum match utility of product i observed so far is zi and there are rms left unsampled.
Then a consumer will stop searching if and only if
1(z1) + 2(z2)  s : (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is the expected benet from sampling one more rm given
the pair of maximum utilities so far is (z1; z2), and the right-hand side is the search
cost. This stopping rule seems myopicat the rst glance, but it is indeed sequentially
rational. It can be understood by backward induction. When in the penultimate rm,
it is clear that (2) gives the optimal stopping rule because given (z1; z2) the expected
benet from sampling the last rm is E[max (0; u1   z1)+max (0; u2   z2)], which equals
the left-hand side of (2). (Note that I did not assume u1 and u2 are independently
distributed. The separability of the incremental benet in (2) is because of the additive
utility function and the linearity of the expectation operator.) Now step back and
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consider the situation when the consumer is at the rm before that. If (2) is violated,
sampling one more rm is always desirable. By contrast, if (2) holds and if the consumer
continues to search, the updated maximum match utility pair will be no worse than
(z1; z2) no matter what she will nd at the next rm, and so she will stop searching
there. This implies that if (2) holds, the benet from keeping searching is the same as
sampling just one more rm. Expecting that, the consumer should actually cease her
search now.
Figure 1 below illustrates the optimal stopping rule. A is the set of (z1; z2) which
satises (2) and let us refer to it as the acceptance set. Then when there are no price
di¤erences across rms, a consumer will stop searching if and only if the maximum
utility pair so far lies within A. Let B be the complement of A.
z1
z2
A
B
a1
a2
z r r
r
z _ u
u
z2 = (z1)
Figure 1: The optimal stopping rule in multiproduct search
Dene the border of A as z2 = (z1) (i.e., (z1; (z1)) satises (2) with equality) and call
it the reservation frontier. The reservation frontier is decreasing and convex. From the
denition of (), one can check that
0(z1) =   1  F1(z1)
1  F2((z1)) < 0 ;
and so () is a decreasing function. Then it is also easy to see that 0(z1) increases
with z1, i.e., () is convex.15
15If we consider two intrinsic complements, the reservation frontier may no longer be decreasing.
For example, when the utility function takes the form of u1 + u2 + u1u2 with  > 0, one can check
that in the duopoly case, for instance, the reservation frontier satises
1
2
(1  u1)2 + 1
2
(1  u2)2 + 
4

(u1   u2)2 + (1  u1u2)2

= s ;
and it is not monotonically decreasing. This is because now nding a better matched product 1 may
strictly increase a consumers incentive to nd a better matched product 2. When there are more than
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Notice that ai on Figure 1 is just the reservation utility level when the consumer is
only searching for product i. (If all product i have the same price, a consumer will stop
searching if and only if the maximum utility so far is no less than ai.) It solves
 i(ai) = s ; (3)
and satises (a1) = u2 and (u1) = a2. This is because when the maximum possible
utility of one product has been achieved, the consumer will behave as if she is only
searching for the other product.
Search behavior comparison. It is useful to compare consumer search behavior be-
tween single-product and multiproduct search. The early literature has emphasized
that in both cases (given additive utilities in the multiproduct case) the optimal stop-
ping rule possesses the static reservation property. Despite this similarity, consumers
search behavior exhibits some important di¤erences between the two cases, which have
not been discussed before.
In single-product search with perfect recall, the stopping rule is characterized by a
reservation utility a. When a consumer is already at some rm (except the last one),
she will stop searching if and only if the current product has a utility greater than
a. Previous o¤ers are irrelevant because they must be worse than a (otherwise the
consumer would not have come to this rm). As a result, a consumer never returns to
previously visited rms until she nishes sampling all rms. In particular, if there are
an innite number of rms, the consumer never exercises the recall option.
However, in multiproduct search, a consumers stopping rule depends on both the
current rms o¤er u and the best o¤er so far z. This can be seen from the example
indicated in Figure 1, where the current o¤er u lies outside the acceptance set A but
the consumer will stop searching because z _ u 2 A (where _ denotes the join of
two vectors). When she stops searching, she will go back to some previous rm to buy
product 2. This has two implications for the demand analysis. First, with multiproduct
search, a rms price adjustment will not only a¤ect a consumers search decision at
this rm, but will also a¤ect her search decisions at subsequent rms if she leaves this
rm. Second, a consumer often returns to a previously visited rm to buy one product
even if there are rms left unsampled. This is true even if there are an innite number
of rms.
These di¤erences will complicate the demand analysis in multiproduct search. More-
over, unlike the single-product search case, considering an innite number of rms does
not achieve any simplicity. In e¤ect, with multiproduct search, the simplest case is
when there are only two rms. Hence, in the following analysis, I mainly deal with the
duopoly case. As I will discuss in section 5.1, such a simplication does not lose the
most important insights concerning rm pricing in a multiproduct search market. (A
detailed analysis of the general case with more than two rms is provided in the online
two rms, considering intrinsic complements will even render the optimal stopping rule non-stationary
(see Gatti, 1999, for a related discussion).
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supplementary document at https://sites.google.com/site/jidongzhou77/research.)
3 Equilibrium Prices
3.1 The single-product benchmark
To facilitate comparison, I rst report some results from the single-product search
model (see Wolinsky, 1986 and Anderson and Renault, 1999 for an analysis with n
rms). Suppose the product in question is product i, and the unit search cost is still
s. Then the reservation utility level is ai dened in (3), and it decreases with s (i.e.,
a higher search cost will make consumers less willing to search on). In the following
analysis, I mainly focus on the case with a relatively small search cost:
s <  i(ui), ai > ui for both i = 1; 2 : (4)
(Remember that  i(ui) is the expected benet from sampling another product i when
the current one has the lowest possible match utility.) This condition ensures an active
search market even in the single-product case.
The symmetric equilibrium price p0i in the duopoly case is then determined by
1
p0i
= fi(ai)[1  Fi(ai)] + 2
Z ai
ui
fi(u)
2du| {z }
0
: (5)
It follows that p0i increases with the search cost s (or decreases with ai) if
fi(ai)
2 + f 0i(ai)[1  Fi(ai)]  0 :
This condition is equivalent to an increasing hazard rate fi=(1 Fi). Then we have the
following result (Anderson and Renault, 1999 have shown this result for an arbitrary
number of rms):
Proposition 1 Suppose the consumer is only searching for product i and the search
cost condition (4) holds. Then the equilibrium price dened in (5) increases with search
costs if the match utility has an increasing hazard rate fi=(1  Fi).
3.2 Equilibrium prices in multiproduct search
I now turn to the multiproduct search case. Let (p1; p2) be the symmetric equilibrium
prices. For notational convenience, let (u1; u2) be the match utilities of rm I, the rm
in question, and (v1; v2) be the match utilities of rm II, the rival rm. In the symmetric
equilibrium, for a consumer who samples rm I rst, her reservation frontier u2 = (u1)
is determined by
1(u1) + 2((u1)) = s ; (6)
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which simply says that the expected benet of sampling rm II is equal to the search
cost. Note that (u1) is only dened for u1 2 [a1; u1] (see Figure 2 below). But
for convenience, let us extend its domain to all possible values of u1, and stipulate
(u1) > u2 for u1 < a1.
Instead of writing down the demand functions and deriving the rst-order conditions
for the equilibrium prices directly, I use the following economically more illuminating
method. Starting from an equilibrium, suppose rm I unilaterally decreases p2 by a
small ". How does this adjustment a¤ect rm Is prots? Let us focus on the rst-order
e¤ects. First, rm I su¤ers a loss from those consumers who only buy product 2 from
it because they are now paying less. Since in equilibrium half of the consumers buy
product 2 from rm I (remember the assumption of full market coverage), this loss is
"=2. Second, rm I gains from boosted demand: (i) For those consumers who visit rm
I rst, they will be more likely to stop searching since they hold equilibrium beliefs that
the second rm is charging the equilibrium prices. Once they stop searching, they will
buy both products from rm I immediately. (ii) For those consumers who eventually
sample both rms, they will be more likely to buy product 2 from rm I due to the
price reduction. In equilibrium, the loss and gain should be such that rm I has no
incentive to deviate, which generates the rst-order condition for p2.
Now let us analyze in detail the two (rst-order) gains from the proposed small price
reduction. The rst gain is from the e¤ect of the price reduction on consumerssearch
decisions. How many consumers who sample rm I rst will stop searching because of
the price reduction? (Note that the consumers who sample rm II rst hold equilibrium
beliefs and so their stopping decisions remain unchanged.)
Denote by (u1j") the new reservation frontier. Since reducing p2 by " is equivalent
to increasing u2 by ", (u1j") solves
1(u1) + 2((u1j") + ") = s ;
so (u1j") = (u1)   " according to the denition of (). That is, the reservation
frontier moves downward everywhere by ", and the stopping region A expands (i.e.,
more consumers buy immediately at rm I) as illustrated in Figure 2 below.16 For a
small ", the number of consumers who originally continued to search but now cease
searching and buy immediately at rm I (i.e., the probability measure of the shaded
area between (u1) and (u1j") in Figure 2) is
"
2
Z u1
a1
f(u; (u))du : (7)
(Remember that half of the consumers sample rm I rst. The integral term is the line
integral along the reservation frontier in the u1 dimension.)
16More precisely, (a1j") = u2   " and so the reservation frontier has a small vertical segment at
u1 = a1. But this does not a¤ect our analysis as " is small.
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Figure 2: Price deviation and the stopping rule
What is rm Is net benet from these marginal consumers? Realize that these
marginal consumers now buy both products from rm I for sure, while before the price
deviation they only bought each product from rm I with some probability less than one
(i.e., when they search on but nd worse products at rm II). To be specic, consider
a marginal consumer on the reservation frontier with match utilities (u1; (u1)). If she
chooses to sample rm II, she will nd a worse product 1 at rm II (i.e., v1 < u1)
with probability F1(u1), in which case she will return to rm I and buy its product 1.
Similarly, if she continues to sample rm II, she will nd a worse product 2 at rm
II (i.e., v2 < (u1)) with probability F2((u1)), in which case she will return to rm I
and buy its product 2. Hence, the net benet from inducing this marginal consumer to
cease searching is p1[1  F1(u1)] + p2[1  F2((u1))]. We then sum this benet over all
marginal consumers on the reservation frontier. By using (7), this total benet is
"
2
Z u1
a1
fp1[1  F1(u)] + p2[1  F2((u))]g f(u; (u))du : (8)
The second gain is from those consumers who sample both rms. They will now
more likely buy product 2 from rm I due to the price reduction. Consider rst a
consumer who visits rm I rst and nds match utilities (u1; u2) 2 B("). She will
then continue to visit rm II, but will return to rm I and buy its product 2 if v2 <
u2 + ". The probability of that event is F2(u2 + ")  F2(u2) + "f2(u2). So the small
price adjustment increases the probability that this consumer buys product 2 from
rm I by "f2(u2). Then the total increased probability from all such consumers is
"
2
R
B(")
f2(u2)dF (u)  "2
R
B
f2(u2)dF (u). (Since B(") converges to B as " ! 0, we can
discard all higher order e¤ects.) Similarly, one can show that the increased probability
that those consumers who sample rm II rst and then come to rm I buy product 2
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at rm I is "
2
R
B
f2(v2)dF (v). Adding them together gives us the second gain, which is
p2"
Z
B
f2(u2)dF (u) : (9)
In equilibrium, the (rst-order) loss "=2 from the small price reduction should be
equal to the sum of the two (rst-order) gains in (8) and (9). This yields the rst-order
condition for p2:
1 = 2p2
Z
B
f2(u2)dF (u) + p2
Z u1
a1
[1  F2((u))]f(u; (u))du| {z }
standard e¤ect
(10)
+ p1
Z u1
a1
[1  F1(u)]f(u; (u))du| {z }
joint search e¤ect
:
The rst two terms on the right-hand side capture the standard e¤ect of a products
price adjustment on its own demand: reducing p2 increases demand for product 2. (This
is similar to the right-hand side of (5) in the single-product search case.)
The last term, however, captures a new feature of the multiproduct search model:
when rm I reduces its p2, more consumers who sample it rst will stop searching and
buy both products, which increases the demand for its product 1 as well. This makes
the two products supplied by the same rm like complements even if they are physically
independent.17 This e¤ect occurs because each consumer is searching for two products
and the cost of search is incurred jointly for them, and so I refer to it as the joint search
e¤ect henceforth.
Also notice that the size of the joint search e¤ect (which determines the degree
of complementarity between the two products in each rm) relies on the mass of
marginal consumers on the reservation frontier, i.e., (7). It depends not only on the
density function f but also on the lengthof the reservation frontier as indicated in
Figure 2. For example, in the uniform distribution case, when the search cost increases,
the reservation frontier becomes longer such that the mass of marginal consumers rises
and thus the two products in each rm become more like complements. As we shall see
below, this observation plays an important role in rmspricing decisions.
Similarly, one can derive the rst-order condition for p1:
1 = 2p1
Z
B
f1(u1)dF (u) + p1
Z u2
a2
[1  F1( 1(u))]f( 1(u); u)du (11)
+ p2
Z u2
a2
[1  F2(u)]f( 1(u); u)du ;
17Notice that the complementarity caused by the joint search cost is di¤erent from intrinsic comple-
mentarity. If information is perfect and the two products are intrinsic complements, then reducing the
price of a rms one product will not inuence consumersdecisions of where to buy the other product.
Hence, considering a perfect information setting with intrinsic complements cannot reproduce the main
results in this paper.
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where  1 is the inverse function of . The rst two terms on the right-hand side reect
the standard e¤ect of adjusting price p1, and the last term captures the joint search
e¤ect. I summarize the results in the following lemma:18
Lemma 2 Under the search cost condition (4), the rst-order conditions for p1 and p2
to be the equilibrium prices are given in (10) and (11).
Both (10) and (11) are linear equations in prices, and the system of the two prices
has a unique solution. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium, if it is characterized by the
rst-order conditions, will be unique. Notice that if rms ignored the joint search e¤ect,
then the pricing problem would be separable between the two products. A special case
is when s = 0 (so ai = ui and B equals the whole match utility domain). Then the
e¤ect of a price adjustment on consumer search behavior (i.e., (8)) disappears, and the
rst-order conditions simplify to
1
pi
= 2
Z ui
ui
fi(u)
2du : (12)
In this case, the multiproduct model yields the same equilibrium prices as the single-
product model.
In the following analysis, I will often rely on the case with two symmetric products.
Slightly abusing the notation, let the one-variable functions F () and f() denote the
common marginal distribution function and density function, respectively. Let a be the
common reservation utility in each dimension. In particular, with symmetric products,
we have f(u1; u2) = f(u2; u1) and the reservation frontier satises () =  1(), i.e., it
is symmetric around the 45-degree line in the match utility space. If p is the equilibrium
price of each product, then both (10) and (11) simplify to
1
p
= 2
Z
B
f(ui)f(ui; uj)du+
Z u
a
[1  F ((u))]f(u; (u))du| {z }
standard e¤ect: 
(13)
+
Z u
a
[1  F (u)]f(u; (u))du| {z }
joint search e¤ect: 
:
18One can also derive the rst-order conditions by calculating the demand functions directly. For
example, when rm I unilaterally deviates to (p1   "1; p2   "2), the demand for its product 1 is
1
2
Z u1
u1
[1 H2((u1j")ju1)(1  F1(u1 + "1))] dF1(u1) + 1
2
Z u1
u1
H2((v1)jv1)(1  F1(v1   "1))dF1(v1) ;
where " = ("1; "2), (u1j") = (u1 + "1)  "2 is the reservation frontier associated with the deviation,
and Hi(j) is the conditional distribution function. Consumers who sample rm I rst will buy its
product 1 if they stop searching immediately or if they continue to search but nd rm IIs product 1
is a worse deal. Consumers who sample rm II rst will purchase rm Is product 1 if they come to
rm I and nd rm Is product 1 is a better deal. The deviation demand for product 2 is similar.
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Discussion: the second-order conditions and asymmetric equilibria. In our multi-
product search model, it is di¢ cult to investigate the second-order conditions in general.
In the online supplementary document, I show that in the case of symmetric products
and independent match utilities, each rms prot function is locally concave around the
price dened in (13) under fairly general conditions. In the examples with uniform and
exponential distribution (which are used for illustration below), it can be numerically
veried that a rms prot function is globally quasi-concave, and thus the rst-order
conditions are su¢ cient for the equilibrium prices.
A related issue is the possible existence of a type of asymmetric equilibrium where
rms put di¤erent products on sale. For example, in the case with symmetric products,
one rm may charge price pL for its product 1 and price pH > pL for its product 2,
and the other rm sets prices in the opposite way. However, as shown in the online
supplementary document, this type of equilibrium cannot be sustained at least when
the two symmetric products have independent match utilities and f is logconcave.
For illustration of the equilibrium prices, I present two examples:
The uniform example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and ui s U [0; 1]. Then
 i(x) = (1   x)2=2. So a = 1  
p
2s, and condition (4) requires s  1=2. The
reservation frontier satises
(1  u)2 + (1  (u))2 = 2s ;
so the stopping region A is a quarter-disk with radius
p
2s. Then (13) implies
p =
1
2  (1
2
   1)s ; (14)
where   3:14 is the mathematical constant. (The standard e¤ect is  = 2 s=2,
and the joint search e¤ect is  = s.)19
The exponential example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and fi(ui) = e ui for
ui 2 [0;1). Then  i(x) = e x. So e a = s, and the search cost condition (4)
requires s  1. The reservation frontier satises
e u + e (u) = s ;
so (u) is one branch of a hyperbola. Then (13) implies
p =
1
1 + 1
6
s3
:
(The standard e¤ect is  = 1, and the joint search e¤ect is  = s3=6.)
The price increases with search costs in the uniform example, but it decreases with
search costs in the exponential example. As I will explain below, the result that prices
can decline with search costs is not exceptional in the multiproduct search model.
19The rst term in (13) is 2
R
B
du, so it equals two times the area of region B, i.e., 2(1 s=2) = 2 s.
The second term in (13) is
R 1
a
[1 (u)]du, which is the area of region A and so equals s=2. The joint
search e¤ect is  =
R 1
a
(1  u)du = s according to the denition of a.
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3.3 Price and search cost
This section investigates how prices vary with search costs. When search costs rise,
there are two e¤ects: First, consumers will become more reluctant to shop around, and
so fewer of them will sample both rms (i.e., the region of B shrinks). This always
induces rms to raise their prices. Second, when search costs rise, the mass of mar-
ginal consumers on the reservation frontier also changes. If the number of marginal
consumers increases with search costs (which is true, for instance, in the uniform dis-
tribution case where the reservation frontier becomes longeras search costs rise in
the permitted range of (4)), rms have an incentive to reduce prices. This incentive is
further strengthened in the multiproduct case due to the joint search e¤ect: stopping
a marginal consumer from continuing to search can boost demand for both products.
The nal prediction depends on which e¤ect dominates.
I introduce the following regularity condition:
hi(uijuj)
1  Fi(ui) increases with ui for any given uj . (15)
In particular, if the two products have independent match utilities, this condition is
just the standard regularity condition of increasing hazard rate in the single-product
case.
In the following, I focus on the case with two symmetric products, and so the
equilibrium price p is given in (13).20 One can see that p increases with search costs if
and only if @
@s
+ @
@s
< 0, where  is the standard e¤ect and  is the joint search e¤ect as
dened in (13). As the following proposition indicates, @
@s
< 0 if the regularity condition
(15) holds. This means that if the joint search e¤ect were absent, prices would increase
with search costs under the condition (15), similar as in the single-product scenario.
However, taking into account the joint search e¤ect can qualitatively change the
picture. As indicated in the following proposition, the joint search e¤ect  can vary
with s in either direction. If @
@s
< 0, the joint search e¤ect will reinforce the standard
e¤ect such that the price increases with search costs even faster. Conversely, if @
@s
> 0
(e.g., when the conditional density is weakly decreasing), the joint search e¤ect will
mitigate or even overturn the usual relationship between price and search costs. As a
result, the regularity condition (15) is not enough to ensure that prices increase with
search costs in our model. The following result gives a new condition (all omitted proofs
can be found in Appendix A):
20Product asymmetry is another force that could inuence the relationship between prices and search
costs. Intuitively, when one product has a lower prot margin than the other, the joint search e¤ect
from adjusting its price is stronger (i.e., reducing its price can induce consumers to buy the other
more protable product). Then this products price may go down with the search cost. For example,
when product 1 has a match utility uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and product 2 has a match utility
uniformly distributed on [0; 4], one can show that p1 decreases while p2 increases with s when s  1=2.
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Proposition 2 Suppose the search cost condition (4) holds, and the two products are
symmetric. Then p dened in (13) increases with search costs if and only ifZ u
a
f((u))
1  F ((u)) ff(u)h(uj(u)) + [1  F (u)]h
0(uj(u))g du| {z }
  @
@s
> f(a; u) 
Z u
a
h0(uj(u))f((u))du| {z }
@
@s
:
(16)
If the two products further have independent match utilities, a su¢ cient condition for
(16) is that the marginal density f(u) is (weakly) increasing.
The condition (16), however, can be easily violated (such that prices decrease with
search costs) even under the regularity condition of (15).21 For example, in the ex-
ponential example with independent match utilities, @
@s
= 0 and @
@s
> 0, and so the
opposite of (16) holds. Other simple examples include the distribution with decreasing
density f(u) = 2(1   u) and the logistic distribution f(u) = eu=(1 + eu)2 when search
costs are relatively small. As we have argued, this surprising result is due to the joint
search e¤ect, the new economic force in our multiproduct search model.
If rms supply (and consumers need) more products, the joint search e¤ect could
have an even more pronounced impact such that prices fall with search costs more
likely. In Appendix A, I extend the two-product model to the case with m products.
In particular, in the uniform case with m symmetric products, the equilibrium price p
has a simple expression:
1
p
= 2  Vm(
p
2s)
2m| {z }
standard e¤ect
+
(m  1)Vm(
p
2s)
2m 1| {z }
joint search e¤ect
; (17)
where s 2 [0; 1=2] and Vm(r) is the volume of an m-dimensional sphere with radius r.22
One can check that p increases with s if and only if m < 1+=2  2:6. Therefore, when
consumers search for more than two products, even in the uniform example, prices start
to decrease with search costs.
Discussion: large search costs. Our analysis so far has been restricted to relatively
small search costs such that it is even worthwhile to search for one good alone. I now
discuss the case with larger search costs beyond condition (4). (In some circumstances,
21If the opposite of (15) holds, the left-hand side of (16) is negative, and meanwhile h0 must be
negative such that the right-hand side is positive. Thus, (16) will fail to hold and so the price p will
decrease with search costs. This is not surprising, because even in the single-product search case (5)
implies that the equilibrium price decreases with search costs if the match utility has a decreasing
hazard rate. What is more surprising in the multiproduct search model is that prices can decrease
with search costs even under the regularity condition.
22The volume of an m-dimensional sphere with radius r is Vm(r) =
(r
p
)m
 (1+m=2) , where  () is the
Gamma function. One can show that for any xed r, limm!1 Vm(r) = 0. Then as m goes to innity,
p will approach the perfect information price 1=2 in expression (12). This is because for a xed search
cost, if each consumer is searching for a large number of products, they will almost surely sample both
rms.
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a consumer conducts multiproduct search because it is not worthwhile to search for
each good separately.) As we shall see later, this discussion will also be useful for
understanding the results in the bundling case. For simplicity, let us focus on the case
of symmetric products. Suppose the condition (4) is violated such that s >  i(u) and
a < u. (But s cannot exceed 2 i(u) to ensure an active search market.) Then the
reservation frontier is shown in Figure 3 below, where c = (u).
u1
u2
A
B
c
c
u2 = (u1)
Figure 3: The optimal stopping rule with large search costs
The key di¤erence between this case and the case of small search costs is that now
the reservation frontier becomes shorter as search costs go up. This feature has a
signicant impact on how prices vary with search costs. For example, in the uniform
case, a higher search cost now leads to fewer marginal consumers on the reservation
frontier, which provides rms with a greater incentive to raise prices. (In this case, the
joint search e¤ect strengthens the usual relationship between prices and search costs.)
I show in the online supplementary document that if the two products are symmetric
and they have independent match utilities, and if search costs are relatively high such
that  i(u) < s < 2 i(u), then the equilibrium price p increases with search costs if each
products match utility has a monotonic density and a (weakly) increasing hazard rate.
3.4 Price comparison with single-product search
As the end of this section, I compare the multiproduct search prices in section 3.2 with
the single-product search prices in section 3.1, and discuss one empirical implication of
the comparison result.
Proposition 3 Suppose the search cost condition (4) and the regularity condition (15)
hold. Then pi  p0i ; i = 1; 2; i.e., each products price is lower in multiproduct search
than in single-product search. (The equality holds when s = 0.)
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This result is intuitive. In our model, there are economies of scale in search (i.e.,
searching for two products is as costly as searching for only one), so more consumers
are willing to sample both rms in multiproduct search, which intensies the price
competition. On top of that, the joint search e¤ect gives rise to a complementary
pricing problem and induces rms to further lower their prices. For example, in the
uniform case with s = 0:1, the multiproduct search price in (14) is 0:51, lower than the
single-product search price 0:64 by 20%. (Notice that p0 = 1=(2  p2s) in the single-
product case.) It is worth emphasizing that even if economies of scale in search are
weak (e.g., when single-product search is less costly than multiproduct search), the joint
search e¤ect can still induce substantial price reduction. For instance, in the uniform
case, if single-product search is half as costly as two-product search (i.e., if the single-
product search cost is s=2), then the single-product search price becomes 1=(2  ps).
The multiproduct search price is still signicantly lower than that. For example, when
s = 0:1, the new single-product search price is 0:59, and the multiproduct search price
0:51 is still lower than it by 13:5%.
As documented inWarner and Barsky (1995), MacDonald (2000), Chevalier, Kashyap,
and Rossi (2003) and others, prices of many retail products fall during demand peaks
such as holidays and weekends. (All these paper use data from multiproduct retailers
such as supermarkets and department stores.) This phenomenon is termed counter-
cyclical pricing. A simple extension of the multiproduct search model can provide a
possible explanation for this phenomenon.23 Suppose there are now both single-product
and multiproduct searchers in the market. Suppose a higher proportion of consumers
become multiproduct searchers during high-demand periods such as weekends and hol-
idays. (For example, many households conduct their weekly grocery shopping during
weekends, and more people buy multiple gifts in Christmas season.24) Then Proposition
3 immediately implies that market prices will decline.
For illustration, I consider an example where there are two symmetric products and
each product is needed by a consumer with a probability  2 [0; 1]. (Our basic model
corresponds to  = 1.) Suppose the need for each product occurs independently across
products and consumers. Then there are three groups of consumers in the market: a
fraction of 2 of consumers are searching for both products, a fraction of 2(1   )
of consumers are searching for only one product, and the rest need none of them. A
demand rise can be reected by an increase of .
23There are of course other possible explanations for countercyclical pricing. For example, it may
be due to the dynamic interaction among competing retailers, who are more likely to have a price war
during demand booms (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). It may also be because retailers advertise price
information more intensely during high-demand periods, or because more low-income consumers who
are usually more price sensitive enter the market.
24Another possible justication is that the demand uctuations may also arise endogenously: an-
ticipating rms pricing pattern, consumers may strategically accumulate their demand for various
products and shop intensively during low-price periods, which in turn justies rmspricing strategies.
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The equilibrium price for each product in this extended model is given by
1
p
= (1  )0 + (+ ) ;
where 0 is the right-hand side of (5), and  and  are the standard e¤ect and the joint
search e¤ect in multiproduct search, respectively. (Conditional on a consumer buying
one product, this consumer is a single-product searcher with probability 1    and a
multiproduct searcher with probability .) Proposition 3 implies that 0 <  + , so
p decreases with . This result is due to both 0 <  (which reects the economies of
scale in search) and  > 0 (which reects the joint search e¤ect).
Warner and Barsky (1995) have suggested an explanation based on consumer search
for countercyclical pricing, though they did not develop a formal search model. Their
idea is wholly based on economies of scale in search, while my model suggests that
even if economies of scale in search are weak, the joint search e¤ect can still induce
multiproduct rms to reduce their prices substantially. In e¤ect, one argument in
Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) against Warner and Barskys explanation is that
they did not nd clear evidence that consumers become signicantly more price elastic
during peak-demand periods. However, they only consider each product (category)s
own-price elasticity. According to our model, the cross-price elasticity due to the joint
search e¤ect may play an important role in multiproduct retailerspricing decisions.
Taking that into account may enhance the explanatory power of a search model for
countercyclical pricing.
4 Bundling in Search Markets
Bundling is a widely used multiproduct pricing strategy. One adopted form, termed
pure bundling, is that the rm sells several products in a package (e.g., software suites,
TV program packages, and music albums), and none of them is available for individual
purchase. The other form, termed mixed bundling, is that alongside each separately
available product, a package is sold at a discount relative to the components. For ex-
ample, retailers such as electronic stores, travel agencies and online book shops often
o¤er a customer a discount if she buys more than one product from the same store. An-
other related example in the retail market is that the shipping fee is often independent
of the number of products (e.g., furniture items) in the same order.
The existing literature on competitive bundling assumes perfect information on the
consumer side (i.e., consumers know all price and product information). However, in
many circumstances where rms use bundling strategies, imperfect information and
consumer search are clearly relevant and could have a signicant inuence on rms
incentive to bundle and the welfare impacts of bundling. This section intends to ll
this gap by allowing rms to adopt bundling strategies in the multiproduct search
model.
21
To illustrate the main insights in a simple way, I focus on the case of pure bundling.
(The case of mixed bundling is more complicated to analyze, but the main results
derived in the pure bundling case hold qualitatively there. See the online supplementary
document for the details.) I assume that when rms bundle, consumers buy only one
of the two bundles, i.e., they will not buy both bundles to mix and match. This is the
case, for instance, when pure bundling introduces the compatibility problem, or when
the bundle price is so high that it is not worthwhile to buy both bundles.25
Bundling and search incentive. I rst examine how bundling might a¤ect con-
sumerssearch incentive. In the linear pricing case, given match utilities (u1; u2) at rm
I, the expected benet from sampling rm II is
E

max
 
0;
P2
i=1(vi   ui); v1   u1; v2   u2

: (18)
(This merely rewrites the left-hand side of (6). The expectation operator is over (v1; v2).)
If both products at rm II are a worse match, the consumer will return and buy at rm
I and so the gain from the extra search will be zero; if both products at rm II are a
better match, the consumer will buy at rm II and gain
P2
i=1(vi   ui); if only product
i at rm II is the better match, she will mix and match and the gain will be vi   ui.
Suppose now both rms adopt the pure bundling strategy and charge the same
prices. Then the expected benet from sampling rm II becomes
E[ max(0;
P2
i=1(vi   ui))] ; (19)
since the opportunity to mix and match has been completely ruled out. This benet
is clearly smaller than (18). Therefore, compared to linear pricing, bundling reduces
consumerssearch incentive and induces them to stop at the rst sampled rm more
often.26
When both rms bundle, consumers in e¤ect face a single-product search problem:
rm I o¤ers a composite product with a match utility U = u1 + u2, and rm II o¤ers
another one with an independent match utility V = v1 + v2. Both U and V belong
to [U = u1 + u2; U = u1 + u2]. Let G() and g() denote their common cdf and pdf,
respectively. Denote by b the reservation utility level in this search problem. It satisesZ U
b
(U   b)dG(U) = s : (20)
The left-hand side is the expected benet from sampling the second bundle given the
rst one has a match utility b. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium a consumer will visit
25For example, in the uniform example below, when the search cost is relatively high, the bundle
price is greater than 1. Then even if rm Is products have match utilities (1; 0) and rm IIs products
have match utilities (0; 1), it is not worthwhile to buy both bundles.
26In the case of mixed bundling, the joint-purchase discount, which is the di¤erence between the
sum of the two stand-alone prices and the bundle price, acts as a cost of mixing-and-matching and so
the benet from sampling one more rm is also reduced.
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the second rm if and only if the rst bundle has a match utility u1+u2 below b. Since
pure bundling reduces consumers search incentive, the acceptance set expands, i.e.,
b < u1 + (u1) for any u1 2 [a1; u1].
Figure 4 below illustrates this change of the consumer stopping rule, where the linear
line is the reservation frontier in the pure bundling case and the new acceptance set is
A plus the shaded area.
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Figure 4: The optimal stopping rule: linear pricing vs pure bundling
As I will demonstrate below, this search-discouraging e¤ect of bundling may make rms
compete less aggressively and reverse the usual welfare impact of competitive bundling.
Incentive to bundle. Starting from the linear pricing equilibrium, does a rm
have a unilateral incentive to introduce bundling in a search environment? Suppose
that rms choose prices and whether to bundle products simultaneously,27 and both
choices are unobservable to consumers until they reach the store.
When a rm unilaterally introduces pure bundling, it will make more consumers who
visit it rst stop searching and buy immediately. (For these consumers, the situation is
now actually equivalent to both rms adopting the bundling strategy.) But bundling
will also exclude some consumers who continue to search and would otherwise come
back and buy a single product. The following result shows that with costly search, the
rst positive e¤ect always dominates.
Proposition 4 In the duopoly model with costly search (s > 0), starting from the linear
pricing equilibrium, each rm has a unilateral incentive to introduce the pure bundling
strategy.
Proof. Each rm earns (p1 + p2)=2 in the linear pricing equilibrium. Now consider
the following deviation: rm I unilaterally bundles its products and sells the bundle at
27In the retail market, bundling strategies are often as easy to adjust as pricing strategies.
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a price p1 + p2. (Before they reach rm I, consumers still hold the equilibrium belief
that rm I is setting linear prices.) Since this deviation does not change the bundle
price, it su¢ ces to show that more than half of the consumers will buy the bundle from
rm I after the deviation. Notice that if both rms bundle and charge the same price,
each will have demand 1=2. So it su¢ ces to show that more consumers will buy the
bundle from rm I in the deviation case than in the pure bundling case with the bundle
price p1 + p2.
Consider rm Is two demand sources: (a) For those consumers who sample rm I
rst, they will act as in the pure bundling case. So the demand from them is the same
as in the pure bundling case. (b) For those consumers who sample rm II rst, they will
adopt the stopping rule in the linear pricing case. So compared to the pure bundling
case, more consumers (i.e., those on the shaded area in Figure 4) will come to rm I.
(This argument relies on costly search. If the search cost is zero, all consumers who
sample rm II rst will come to rm I in either case.) But once they arrive at rm I
and nd out its bundling strategy, they will make choices as in the pure bundling case.
Hence, in the deviation case, the demand from those consumers who sample rm II rst
is greater than in the pure bundling case. Combining (a) and (b) proves the result.
It is also easy to see that starting from the situation where both rms bundle
(and consumers believe so), no rm has a unilateral incentive to unbundle. This is
simply because given consumersbeliefs and the rivals bundling strategy, unilaterally
unbundling has no impact at all on the market. Therefore, if rms choose prices and
their bundling strategies simultaneously, the only symmetric equilibrium is a bundling
equilibrium.
Comparison with linear pricing. When rms bundle, we have in e¤ect a single-
product search problem. Let P be the symmetric equilibrium bundle price. Then,
similar to (5), P is determined in
1
P
= g(b)[1 G(b)] + 2
Z b
U
g(U)2dU ; (21)
where the reservation utility b has been dened in (20). P increases with search costs
provided that U = u1 + u2 has an increasing hazard rate (which is true, for example,
when each ui has an increasing hazard rate and is independent from uj, as shown by
Miravete, 2002).
When information is perfect, Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989), and
Nalebu¤ (2000) have shown in a two-dimensional Hotelling setting (with unit demand
and full market coverage) that pure bundling typically lowers price (and prot) and
boosts consumer welfare. This is mainly because pure bundling makes a price reduction
doubly protable, thereby intensifying price competition, and the price reduction is
large enough to outweigh the restriction of choices available with pure bundling.
The same argument applies in our setting when the search cost is zero. Suppose
the two products are symmetric. Then from (13) and (21) we can see that at s = 0 (so
24
a = u and b = U) pure bundling results in a lower bundle price (P < 2p) if and only ifZ u
u
f(u)2du < 2
Z U
U
g(U)2dU : (22)
With independent match utilities, one can check that this condition holds for a large
range of distributions such as uniform, normal and logistic. But it does not always
hold. For instance, as we will see below, in the exponential case the equality of (22)
holds. (However, as implied by Proposition 5 below, if consumers buy a large number
of products, pure bundling always leads to a lower bundle price than linear pricing in
the perfect information case.)
When search is costly, the pro-competitive e¤ect of pure bundling still applies to
those consumers who sample both rms. However, pure bundling weakens consumers
search incentive and so reduces the number of informed consumers in the rst place,
which tends to soften price competition. The net e¤ect hinges on the relative importance
of these two forces. Intuitively, when the search cost is higher, there will be fewer fully
informed consumers, and then the rst e¤ect will be less important and pure bundling
may lead to a higher bundle price. This intuition is conrmed in our two examples:
The uniform example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and ui s U [0; 1]. To
facilitate the comparison with linear pricing, we keep the search cost condition
s  1=2. One can show that G(U) = U2=2 and g(U) = U if U 2 [0; 1], and
G(U) = 1   (2   U)2=2 and g(U) = 2   U if U 2 [1; 2]. According to (20), the
reservation utility b satises (2   b)3=6 = s if s 2 [0; 1=6] (so b  1 in this case),
and 1  b+ b3=6 = s if s 2 [1=6; 1=2] (so b < 1 in this case). Then (21) implies
P =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
4
3
  s if s 2 [0;
1
6
)
1
1
6
b3 + b
if s 2 [1
6
; 1
2
]
:
One can check that P increases with s, but the speed is much faster when s  1=6.
(The upward sloping curve in Figure 5(a) below depicts how P   2p varies with
search costs.) This is because in the range of s 2 [0; 1=6), b > 1 and so as
s increases, the reservation frontier gets longer (i.e., there are more marginal
consumers on the frontier), which mitigates rmsincentive to raise prices. By
contrast, after s exceeds 1=6, b < 1 and so the reservation frontier gets shorter
as s increases, which strengthens rmsincentive to raise prices. In other words,
when the reservation frontier is still getting longer in the linear pricing case, it
already starts to get shorter in the bundling case. In particular, when the search
cost exceeds about 0:26, the bundle price is higher in the pure bundling case than
in the linear pricing case.
The exponential example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and fi(ui) = e ui for
ui 2 [0;1). Then G(U) = 1  (1+U)e U and g(U) = Ue U . (Note that U has a
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strictly increasing hazard rate, though ui has a constant one.) According to (20),
the reservation utility b satises (2 + b)e b = s. Substituting G and g into (21)
yields
P =
2
1  e 2b ;
which increases with s and is always greater than the bundle price 2p in the linear
pricing case (except P = 2p at s = 0). (The upper curve in Figure 5(b) depicts
how P   2p varies with search costs in this example.) With pure bundling, as s
increases the reservation frontier always gets shorter in the exponential case,
which explains why pure bundling reverses the relationship between price and
search costs.
Now let us examine the welfare impact of pure bundling relative to linear pricing.
The rst observation is that total welfare dened as the sum of industry prot and
consumer surplus must fall with bundling. With the assumption of full market cover-
age, consumer payment is a pure transfer and so only the match e¢ ciency (including
search costs) matters. Bundling reduces e¢ ciency because it not only results in insu¢ -
cient consumer search (i.e., too few consumers search beyond the rst sampled rm due
to bundling) but also rules out the opportunity to mix and match for the consumers who
sample both rms. This general result holds no matter whether information frictions
exist or not.
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Figure 5: The welfare impact of pure bundling
However, how bundling a¤ects industry prot and consumer surplus depends on the
size of search frictions. First, each rm earns a higher prot whenever pure bundling
leads to a higher bundle price (given the assumption of full market coverage). Hence,
given that total welfare always falls with bundling, consumers must become worse o¤
if the bundle price rises in the pure bundling case. But things are less clear when the
bundle price falls because consumers also end up consuming less well matched goods in
the pure bundling case. In the uniform example, as indicated by the downward sloping
curve in Figure 5(a) which represents the impact of pure bundling on consumer surplus
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relative to linear pricing, pure bundling benets consumers when search costs are lower
than about 0:24, but it harms consumers when search costs exceed that threshold. In
the exponential case, pure bundling always harms consumers since it (weakly) raises
the bundle price for any search cost level. This is indicated by the lower curve in Figure
5(b). (Calculating consumer surplus directly in our multiproduct search framework is
complicated. In Appendix B, I develop a more e¢ cient indirect method.)
In sum, in a search environment pure bundling can generate a signicant competition-
relaxing e¤ect such that relative to linear pricing it can benet rms and harm con-
sumers, in contrast to the perfect information case.28
Nevertheless, this search-based e¤ect is most pronounced when the number of goods
a consumer is looking for is relatively small. If a consumer is looking for a large number
of goods and if the search cost is xed, she will almost surely sample both rms, and
the situation will be close to the perfect information case. Then, as the following result
shows, the pro-competitive e¤ect of pure bundling will dominate.
Proposition 5 For given search costs, if each rm supplies (and each consumer needs)
a large number of symmetric products with independent match utilities, then compared
to linear pricing, pure bundling leads to a lower bundle price and so lower industry
prots, and it benets consumers if f is logconcave.
This result is not trivial, and it has not been noticed in the existing literature. Pure
bundling leads to lower prices, but it also lowers match e¢ ciency. What I show in the
proof is that the bundle price increases with the number of products much slower in the
pure bundling case than in the linear pricing case, such that the price e¤ect eventually
dominates the match e¤ect and consumers become better o¤.
5 Concluding Discussion
This paper has two contributions: First, it developed a tractable multiproduct search
framework and showed how consumers and rms may behave di¤erently compared to
the single-product search case. In particular, the presence of the joint search e¤ect can
induce prices to decline with search costs even in regular cases. Second, the multiprod-
uct search framework has been used to address economic issues such as countercyclical
pricing and bundling, and new insights emerged. For instance, compared to the perfect
information scenario, the welfare assessment of competitive bundling can be reversed
in a search environment.
28A more extreme example is when the two products are symmetric but have perfectly negatively
correlated match utilities. Then in the pure bundling case, the two bundles are in e¤ect homogenous.
With perfect information, we have Bertrand competition and price will be equal to marginal cost,
which is better than linear pricing for consumers; while with costly search, we have the Diamond
paradox in which all consumers stop at the rst sampled rm (if the rst search is costless) and the
price will be the monopoly price, which is of course worse than linear pricing for consumers.
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In the remainder of this section, I discuss the case with an arbitrary number of rms
and the case with costly recall, and I also discuss two other applications of the model.
5.1 More rms
Considering an arbitrary number of rms entails a more intricate analysis (see the online
supplementary document for the details). But the main insights from the duopoly case
survive.
When there are more than two rms, if a rm is not at the rst position of a
consumers search process, the consumer may go back to a previous rm to buy one
product when she ceases searching. Hence, the joint search e¤ect is weakened, but it
does not vanish. For instance, in the exponential example with more than two rms,
prices still declines with s due to the joint search e¤ect.
Compared to linear pricing, if the maximum utilities so far are xed, bundling
still reduces the benet from sampling more rms, and so it has a tendency to restrain
consumerssearch incentive. However, with more than two rms, bundling also restricts
the opportunity of mixing-and-matching among previous o¤ers and thus lowers the
maximum utilities so far. This tends to increase consumers search incentive. The
nal e¤ect depends on which force dominates. But numerical simulations suggest that
the new force is relatively weak. For example, in the uniform case with n = 1, pure
bundling reduces consumer search intensity when s is greater than about 0:03; and in
the exponential case with n = 1, pure bundling reduces consumer search intensity
for all s permitted in condition (4). Numerical calculations in the two examples also
suggest that pure bundling lead to a higher bundle price and lower consumer surplus
when s is relatively large.
5.2 Costly recall
In many cases (e.g., in the case of high street shopping), returning to a previously visited
store is costly. The consumer search literature, however, often assumes free recall for
tractability.29 Another justication for the assumption of free recall is that, if we
consider an innite number of rms in the single-product search case, consumers never
return to previously visited rms and the optimal stopping rule is always stationary,
independent of the recall assumption. But as I have argued before, in the multiproduct
search case, returning occurs even if there are an innite number of rms and so the
recall assumption matters for the stopping rule.
When recall is costly, the optimal stopping rule in multiproduct search has a new
feature: when one product is a good match and the other is a bad match, a consumer
may buy the well-matched product rst (to avoid paying the returning cost) and then
29Janssen and Parakhonyak (2010) studies the optimal stopping rule in the price search case with a
single product and costly recall. They nd that when there are more than two (but a nite number
of) rms, the stopping rule is non-stationary and depends on the historical o¤ers in an intricate way.
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continue to search for the other. As a result, each rm will (endogenously) face both
single-product searchers (who have bought one product from some previous rm) and
multiproduct searchers (who have not bought any product). The main di¢ culty in
dealing with the case with costly recall is that the optimal stopping rule does not have
a simple characterization (even in the duopoly case), which hinders demand analysis.
Although an analysis with costly recall is di¢ cult, I anticipate that the joint search
e¤ect should survive given that there still exist multiproduct searchers in the search
process. However, the e¤ect of bundling on consumer search could be di¤erent. For
instance, in the polar case with no recall, since consumers cannot return to mix and
match anyway, bundling does not reduce consumerssearch incentive. However, in a
more reasonable case where recall is costly but not impossible the search-discouraging
e¤ect of bundling, though reduced, will persist.
5.3 Search costs vs shopping costs
Search costs usually mean the costs that are incurred to nd and evaluate a new option
when information is initially imperfect. The literature sometimes also considers shop-
ping costs that are not related to information search. For example, in a multiproduct
case, even if information is perfect, there may still exist shopping costs (e.g., the costs
of paying several bills) when the customer sources supplies from more than one rm
(see, for instance, Klemperer, 1992, and Armstrong and Vickers, 2010). This kind of
search unrelated shopping costs also induce customers to one-stop shop more likely,
and can cause a similar e¤ect as the joint search e¤ect in this paper: they render two
independent products in each rm complements and so have a tendency to intensify
price competition. But compared to search costs, this kind of shopping costs are often
less important in the retail market.
In addition, there is also an essential di¤erence between search costs and search
unrelated shopping costs: search costs always have an anti-competitive e¤ect by reduc-
ing the number of rms a consumer considers in the market. However, how shopping
costs a¤ect competition may crucially depend on whether consumers face information
frictions and need to conduct costly information search. If information is initially per-
fect, shopping costs are pro-competitive due to the complementary pricing issue. While
if there is costly information search, shopping costs can work in the opposite way by
reducing the benet from mixing and matching and so dampening consumerssearch in-
centive. (Notice that the search unrelated shopping cost is similar to the joint-purchase
discount in mixed bundling. When it is su¢ ciently large, it works as the pure bundling
strategy.)
5.4 Other applications
In this part, I briey discuss two other applications of the multiproduct search model
which deserve separate research.
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Search and loss leader pricing. Retailers often adopt the loss leader pricing
strategy: they sell some products at very low prices (sometimes even below marginal
costs) to attract consumers to visit and then make money back from other products
with high prot margins. A variant of our multiproduct search model can be used to
study this pricing strategy.
Suppose consumers know some productsmatch utilities and prices before search,
but they need to visit rms to nd out the information of other products. This is
probably the case, for example, when some products are frequently purchased while
others are not, or when some products are advertised by rms, or when rms deliberately
hide the information of some products (e.g., add-ons). Specically, suppose that product
is information is perfect but product js information is not. For simplicity, let us
consider the case where the two products have independent match utilities (and so
observing ui and vi does not provide any new information about uj and vj). Suppose
that each rm simultaneously chooses Pi, the observable price of product i, and pj, the
unobservable price of product j. Then one can derive the rst-order conditions for Pi
and pj in the symmetric equilibrium:30
Pi =
1
2
R ui
ui
fi(u)2du| {z }
perfect info price
  [1  Fj(aj)]2pj| {z }
loss leading e¤ect
and
1
pj
= fj(aj)[1  Fj(aj)] + 2
Z aj
uj
fj(u)
2du ;
where aj is the reservation utility in the single-product search case as dened in (3).
Notice that the unobservable price pj is the same as in the single-product search
case (since consumers will search as in a single-product case once they arrive at the
rst rm), while the observable price Pi equals the price in the perfect information case
adjusted by a loss leading e¤ect. Reducing the price of product i will attract more
consumers to visit rst, and thus it will increase not only the demand for product i
but also the demand for product j. This is similar to the joint search e¤ect in our
base model. In our base model, when a rm reduces a products price (privately), it
can cause some consumers who are already in the store to cease searching; but when
this price reduction is public, it can increase the store tra¢ c in the rst place. This
cross-price e¤ect, referred to as the loss leading e¤ect, is more pronounced than the
joint search e¤ect in our base model. As a result, rms will compete intensely in the
observable price to attract consumers such that loss leading (i.e., Pi < 0) can occur.31
Under the regularity condition of increasing hazard rate, one can show that (i) the
observable price Pi decreases while the unobservable price pj increases with search costs,
30The proofs of all analytical statements in the discussion are available upon request.
31In the base model, even with asymmetric products, I did not nd any examples in which the joint
search e¤ect is strong enough such that loss leading occurs.
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and (ii) a su¢ cient condition for loss leading is that product j has a (weakly) higher
prot margin than product i in the perfect information situation (i.e.,
R uj
uj
fj(u)
2du R ui
ui
fi(u)
2du) and search costs are su¢ ciently high (but the search market is still active).
For example, in the uniform distribution example with two symmetric products, we have
Pi =
1
2
  2s
2 p2s and pj =
1
2 p2s . The former is negative when s is greater than about
0:3. In e¤ect, there is evidence that in the grocery market, for instance, loss leaders
are usually staples such as milk and dairy, alcohol, bread and bakery products that
consumers purchase repeatedly and regularly. This is consistent with our prediction:
for these frequently purchased products, consumers may know their product and price
information, and they also usually exhibit little product di¤erentiation across retailers
such that their prot margins are low in a perfect information setting.
If we use advertising to justify the perfect information of loss leaders (as Lal and
Matutes, 1994, did), a few interesting questions deserve further investigation: Starting
from the base model without advertising, do rms have incentives to advertise? If so,
what products (if products are asymmetric) will rms choose to advertise, and what is
the welfare impact of advertising? (Notice that my model has a meaningful benchmark
without advertising, which will make welfare comparison more interesting.)
Search and retail market structure. In the retail market, large multiproduct
retailers such as department stores often coexist with smaller competitors such as spe-
cialist shops which have narrower product ranges. What is the value of being a large
multiproduct retailer? A large retailer may enjoy economies of scale in operations, and
may also have an advantage in bargaining with manufacturers. But from the demand
side, one important advantage of being a multiproduct retailer is to provide consumers
with the convenience of one-stop shopping. The multiproduct search framework de-
veloped in this paper can be modied to study competition between large and small
retailers, and it can also be used to study endogenous retail market structure.
Consider, for example, a market with three rms: one rm supplies two products
(say, clothes and shoes), while the other two rms are single-product shops (say, one
is a clothes shop, and the other is a shoe shop). Suppose consumerscosts of reaching
any rm are identical for all rms. Then in the setting with symmetric products and
independent match utilities, it can be shown that under the regularity condition of
increasing hazard rate, there is an equilibrium in which the multiproduct rm charges
lower prices than the two single-product rms, and consumers visit the multiproduct
rm rst.32 This result indicates that all else equal, a multiproduct retailer might have
an incentive to charge lower prices than its smaller competitors.
The multiproduct search model can also be extended to discuss endogenous retail
32Consumer search order reveals information about their preferences: a consumer will visit a single-
product shop only if she is unsatised with the product in the multiproduct shop. This gives the
single-product shops extra monopoly power and induces them to charge higher prices. This logic is
similar to Armstrong et al. (2009) and Zhou (2011) which study non-random search in a single-product
search scenario.
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market structure. Suppose there are initially four single-product retailers in the market,
two supplying shoes and the other two supplying clothes. Each product is horizontally
di¤erentiated across its two suppliers. Suppose conglomerate merger between two shops
supplying di¤erent products is possible and costless (but horizontal merger between
two shops selling the same product is not permitted, for example, because of antitrust
reason). Retailers make their publicly observable merger choices before they engage in
price competition. In such an extended model, it can be shown, for example, in the
uniform distribution case that asymmetric market structure with a big and two small
retailers arises when search costs are relatively low, while for high search costs, two big
multiproduct stores emerge in equilibrium. (If conglomerate merger involves some (not
too high) xed costs, the fragmented market structure with four single-product shops
is an equilibrium outcome when the search cost is su¢ ciently small.) This suggests
that the size of search friction could be an important determinant of the retail market
structure.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2: In the case of symmetric products, from (13) we know the
standard e¤ect is
 = 2
Z
B
f(ui)dF (u) +
Z u
a
[1  F ((u))]f(u; (u))du
=
Z u
u
(
2
Z (u)
u
f(ui)h(uiju)dui + [1  F ((u))]h((u)ju)
)
dF (u) :
(Note that for u < a, (u) is independent of a and 1 F ((u)) = 0.) Using the notation
(xju)  f(x)h(xju) + [1  F (x)]h0(xju) ; (23)
we have
d
ds
=
Z u
a
d(u)
ds
((u)ju)dF (u) =
Z u
a
0(u)
1  F (u)((u)ju)dF (u)
=  
Z u
a
f((x))
1  F ((x))(xj(x))dx :
The second step used
d(u)
ds
=   1
1  F ((u)) ; 
0(u) =   1  F (u)
1  F ((u)) ; (24)
which are both derived from the denition of () in (6). The last step is from changing
the integral variable from u to x = (u) and using the symmetry of (). Notice that
the regularity condition (15) implies (xju) > 0 for any given u. So d
ds
< 0 under (15).
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The joint search e¤ect is  =
R u
a
[1  F (u)]f(u; (u))du, and so
d
ds
= f(a; u) 
Z u
a
d(u)
ds
[1  F (u)]h0((u)ju)f(u)du
= f(a; u) 
Z u
a
[ 0(u)]h0((u)ju)f(u)du
= f(a; u) 
Z u
a
h0(xj(x))f((x))dx :
The rst step used da
ds
=  1=[1  F (a)], the second step used (24), and the last step is
again from changing the integral variable from u to x = (u). Therefore, p = 1=(+)
increases with s if and only if d
ds
+ d
ds
 0 or the condition (16) in the main text holds.
Now suppose the two products have independent valuations and the marginal density
satises f 0(u)  0. Then
 d
ds
=
Z u
a
f((x))
1  F ((x))ff(x)
2 + [1  F (x)]f 0(x)gdx

Z u
a
f((x))
1  F ((x))f(x)
2dx  f(a)
1  F (a)
Z u
a
f(x)2dx
 f(a)
2
1  F (a)
Z u
a
f(x)dx = f(a)2 ;
and
 d
ds
=
Z u
a
f 0(x)f((x))dx  f(a)f(u)  f(a)[f(u)  f(a)]  f(a)f(u) =  f(a)2 :
Therefore, d
ds
+ d
ds
 0, i.e., p increases with s.
The case with m products: I rst present the rst-order conditions for the linear
pricing case with m products. Let u i  (uj)j 6=i 2 Rm 1. In a symmetric equilibrium,
without loss of generality the reservation frontier can be dened as um = (u m), where
(u m) satises
m 1X
i=1
 i(ui) + m((u m)) = s :
As in the two-product case, let A denote the acceptance set and B denote its comple-
ment. Suppose rm II sticks to the equilibrium prices, and rm I lowers pm by a small
". Following the same logic as in the two-product case, the rst-order condition for pm
is
1 = 2pm
Z
B
fm(um)dF (u) + pm
Z
A m
[1  Fm((u m))]f(u m; (u m))du m| {z }
standard e¤ect
+
m 1X
i=1
pi
Z
A m
[1  Fi(ui)]f(u m; (u m))du m| {z }
joint search e¤ect
; (25)
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where A m is the projection of A on an (m   1)-dimensional hyperplane with a xed
um.
Now consider the uniform case with m symmetric products and independent match
utilities. Then the rst integral in (25) measures the volume of solid B, and thus it
equals one minus the volume of solid A. Since A is 1=2m of an m-dimensional sphere
with radius
p
2s, we get
1  Vm(
p
2s)
2m
:
(See the expression for Vm() in footnote 22.) The second integral equalsZ
A m
[1  (u m)]du m = Vm(
p
2s)
2m
;
since it just measures the volume of A. Finally, the third integral equalsZ
A m
(1  u1)du m = Vm(
p
2s)
2m 1
: (26)
(This equality has no straightforward geometric interpretation. See its proof below.)
Then (17) in the main text follows.
Proof of (26): For m = 2, A m = [a; 1] and (26) is easy to be veried. Now consider
m  3. Let A 1;m(u1) be a sliceof A m at u1. Then we haveZ
A m
(1  u1)du m =
Z 1
a
(1  u1)
 Z
A 1;m(u1)
du 1;m
!
du1 :
SinceA 1;m(u1) is 1=2m 2 of an (m 2)-dimensional sphere with radius r =
p
2s  (1  u1)2,
the internal integral term equals
Vm 2(r)
2m 2
=
(m 2)=2rm 2
2m 2 (m=2)
;
where  () is the Gamma function. Hence,Z
A m
(1  u1)du m = 
(m 2)=2
2m 2 (m=2)

Z 1
a
(1  u1)
p
2s  (1  u1)2
m 2
du1
=
(m 2)=2
2m 2 (m=2)

 p
2s
m
m
=
Vm(
p
2s)
2m 1
:
The second step used a = 1 p2s and the fact that the integrand is the derivative of
1
m
(
p
2s  (1  u1)2)m with respect to u1. The last step used the expression for Vm()
and the fact x (x) =  (x+ 1).
Proof of Proposition 3: Let us consider product 2. (The proof for product 1 is
similar.) From (10), we have
1
p2
> 2
Z
B
f2(u2)dF (u) +
Z u1
a1
[1  F2((u1))]f(u1; (u1))du1
=
Z u1
u1
(
2
Z (u1)
u2
f2(u2)h2(u2ju1)du2 + [1  F2((u1))]h2((u1)ju1)
)
dF1(u1) :
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Under the regularity condition (15), the curly-bracket term is an increasing function of
(u1). Since (u1)  a2, it is greater than
2
Z a2
u2
f2(u2)h2(u2ju1)du2 + [1  F2(a2)]h2(a2ju1) :
Realizing
R u1
u1
h2(xju1)dF1(u1) = f2(x), we have
1
p2
>
Z u1
u1
(
2
Z a2
u2
f2(u2)h2(u2ju1)du2 + [1  F2(a2)]h2(a2ju1)
)
dF1(u1)
= 2
Z a2
u2
f2(u2)
2du2 + [1  F2(a2)]f2(a2) = 1
p02
:
Proof of Proposition 5: For a given search cost, when the number of products goes
to innity, consumers will always sample both rms. Therefore, we only need to prove
the result in the perfect information scenario.
Suppose each rm supplies m products, and each products match utility is dis-
tributed independently according to a cdf F () and has a mean  and variance 2.
When m is large, by applying the central limit theorem, the match utility of the bundle
distributes (approximately) according to a normal distribution N(m;m2), so
g(U)  1p
2m
exp

 1
2
(U  m)2
m2

:
When s = 0, one can check that (21) implies
1
P
= 2
Z 1
 1
g(U)2dU  1p
m
:
That is, the bundle price P rises at the speed of
p
m. However, in the linear pricing
case with s = 0 we have
1
mp
=
2
m
Z 1
 1
f(u)2du :
So the bundle price mp rises at the speed of m. Hence, when s = 0, P < mp for a
su¢ ciently large m. (This generalizes Nalebu¤ (2000)s observation in the Hotelling
model with a uniform distribution.)
Now turn to consumer surplus. Denote by v the consumer surplus in the linear
pricing case with s = 0. Then the expected surplus from each product is
v
m
= E[max(ui; vi)]  p :
Denote by V the consumer surplus in the pure bundling case with s = 0. Then
V
m
= E

max

1
m
Pm
i=1 ui;
1
m
Pm
i=1 vi

  P
m
:
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As P rises with m at the speed of
p
m, P=m tends to zero as m ! 1. On the other
hand, the expectation term tends to . So
lim
m!1
V
m
=  :
Therefore, when s = 0 and m is large, pure bundling improves consumer welfare if
E[max(ui; vi)]    < p. With linear pricing, consumers enjoy better matched goods
(which is reected by the left-hand side) but they also pay more (which is reected
by the right-hand side). Using 1=p = 2
R u
u
f(u)2du, this condition can be written asR u
u
udF (u)2   R u
u
udF (u) < 1=(2
R u
u
f(u)2du). By integration by parts, it simplies toZ u
u
F (u)[1  F (u)]du
Z u
u
f(u)2du

<
1
2
:
This is further equivalent toZ 1
0
t(1  t)
f(F 1(t))
dt
Z 1
0
f(F 1(t))dt

<
1
2
(27)
by changing the integral variable from u to t = F (u). (27) holds if f is logconcave by
invoking the following lemma.33
Lemma 3 Suppose ' : [0; 1]! R is a nonnegative function such that R 1
0
'(t)
t(1 t)dt <1,
and h : [0; 1]! R is a concave pdf. ThenZ 1
0
'(t)
h(t)
dt  max
Z 1
0
'(t)
2t
dt;
Z 1
0
'(t)
2(1  t)dt

:
Let '(t) = t(1  t) and
h(t) =
f(F 1(t))R 1
0
f(F 1(t))dt
:
Since f(F 1(t)) is concave if and only if f is logconave, the dened h(t) is indeed a
concave pdf. (The integral in the denominator is nite since f(F 1(t)) is nonnegative
and concave.) Then the lemma implies that the left-hand side of (27) is no greater than
1=4.34 (For the exponential density f(x) = e x, it equals 1=4.)
Proof. Since h is a concave pdf, it is a mixture of triangular distributions and
admits a representation of the form
h(t) =
Z 1
0
h(t)()d ;
33I am grateful to Tomás F. Móri in Budapest for helping me to prove this lemma.
34Our result is not tight. However, if f is non-logconcave, it is easy to nd counterexamples. For
instance, (27) fails to hold for a power distribution F (x) = xk with k close to 1=2, or for a Weibull
distribution F (x) = 1  e xk with a small k 2 (0; 1).
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where () is a pdf dened on [0; 1], h1(t) = 2t, h0(t) = 2(1  t), and for 0 <  < 1
h(t) =
8>>><>>>:
2
t

if 0  t < 
2
1  t
1   if   t  1
:
(See, for instance, Example 5 in Csiszár and Móri, 2004.)
By Jessens inequality we have
1
h(t)
=
1R 1
0
h(t)()d

Z 1
0
1
h(t)
()d :
ThenZ 1
0
'(t)
h(t)
dt 
Z 1
0
'(t)
Z 1
0
1
h(t)
()d

dt =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
'(t)
h(t)
dt

()d  sup
11
Z 1
0
'(t)
h(t)
dt :
Notice that Z 1
0
'(t)
h(t)
dt =

2
Z 
0
'(t)
t
dt+
1  
2
Z 1

'(t)
1  tdt :
This is a convex function of , because its derivative is
1
2
Z 
0
'(t)
t
dt  1
2
Z 1

'(t)
1  tdt ;
which is increasing in . Hence, its maximum is attained at one of the endpoints of the
domain [0; 1]. This completes the proof.
Appendix B: Calculating Consumer Surplus
In our search model (especially in the case of linear pricing and the case of mixed
bundling analyzed in the supplementary document), it is complicated to calculate con-
sumer surplus directly. Here I develop a more e¢ cient indirect method (which also
carries over to the case with more than two rms).
For any given symmetric price vector p (which can be a linear or bundling pricing
scheme) and search cost s, consumer surplus is
v(sjp) = sup
2
[U(jp)  s  t()] ; (28)
where  is the (well-dened) set of all possible stopping rules, U(jp) is the expected
match utility minus payment if the consumer chooses a particular stopping rule , and
t() is the expected search times. Let (sjp) be the optimal stopping rule associated
with p and s. Since the objective function in (28) is linear in s, v(sjp) is convex in s
and so is di¤erentiable almost everywhere. Then the envelope theorem implies that
v0(sjp) =  t((sjp))   t^(sjp) :
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If p is an equilibrium price vector, then t^(sjp) is just the corresponding equilibrium
number of searches. (In the duopoly case, it equals two minus the measure of the
stopping region.) We can then decompose consumer surplus into two parts:
v(sjp) = v(0jp) 
Z s
0
t^(xjp)dx ; (29)
where the rst term captures the surplus when the information is perfect (but given
prices p), and the second term reects the ine¢ ciency caused by imperfect information
and costly search.
We can apply the general formula (29) to any case discussed in this paper. For
example, in the linear pricing case with two rms, v(0jp) =P2i=1 (E[max (ui; vi)]  pi),
and the optimal stopping rule is independent of p and so t^(x) = 2  A(x), where A(x)
is the measure of the acceptance set when the search cost is x. In the pure bundling
case, v(0jp) = E[max (U; V )]  P and t^(x) = 1 +G(b(x)).
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